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Abstract: ‘Nudge’ is a concept of policy intervention that originates in
Thaler and Sunstein’s (2008) popular eponymous book. Following their own
hints, we distinguish three properties of nudge interventions: they redirect
individual choices by only slightly altering choice conditions (here ‘nudge 1’);
they use rationality failures instrumentally (here ‘nudge 2’); and they
alleviate the unfavourable effects of these failures (here ‘nudge 3’). We
explore each property in semantic detail and show that no entailment
relation holds between them. This calls into question the theoretical unity of
nudge as intended by Thaler and Sunstein and most of their followers. We
eventually recommend pursuing each property separately, both in policy
research and at the foundational level. We particularly emphasise the need
for reconsidering the respective roles of decision theory and behavioural
economics to delineate nudge 2 correctly. The paper differs from most in the
literature in focusing on the deﬁnitional rather than the normative problems
of nudge.
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Introduction
Nudge is a concept of policy intervention that originates in Thaler and
Sunstein’s (2008) eponymous book and has disseminated from there to
various areas of law, economics, philosophy and social theory.1 Thaler and
Sunstein (henceforth T&S) introduce it as a general category, allowing the
intervening parties to be either public or private and to pursue any kind of
* Correspondence to: GREGHEC, CNRS and HEC Paris, 1 rue de la Libération, F-78350 Jouy-en-
Josas, France. Email: mongin@greg-hec.com
1Nudge (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008) is intended for a wide audience and should be supplemented
by more academic work published both earlier and later by the authors, whether jointly or separately.
However, because it is the core source, we will primarily refer to the book, here cited in the paperback,
slightly expanded edition (Nudge, Thaler & Sunstein, 2009).
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interest. However, they speciﬁcally emphasise, and argue for, nudges by public
authorities that mean to increase the welfare of the population – in short,
welfare-promoting nudges – and the lively discussions prompted by their
work are mostly concerned with this class of interventions. Today’s policy
research has witnessed a collective effort to substitute traditional welfare eco-
nomics with a more appropriate theoretical basis for public policies, and nudge
is a major inspiration for this endeavour. However, even when it is so
restricted, nudge can be understood in more than one sense, and this paper
is about this semantic diversity. We hope to contribute to the current trend
in policy research by analysing the concept more fully than is usually done.
According to one sense, a nudge is a policy intervention for redirecting an
agent’s choices by very slightly altering their choice conditions so that the inter-
ference is kept to a minimum. Having this sense in mind, T&S contrast welfare-
promoting nudges with traditional public policies, which typically rely on bans,
commands or heavy manipulations of choice incentives. In another sense,
nudge is a policy intervention that reaches its objective by taking advantage
of the rationality failures of the choosers. T&S strongly emphasise cognitive
and practical limitations to decision making, as evidenced by today’s behav-
ioural economics, and their book is also a survey of these ﬁndings. Since trad-
itional public policies often, if not always, instrumentally rely on rational
responses from individuals, a new contrast emerges between these policies
and welfare-promoting nudges; arguably, the latter have a more satisfactory
empirical basis than the former. However, T&S do not simply view individual
rationality failures as a new technique of intervention. They also believe that
these failures diminish welfare and should be removed, or at least alleviated,
by suitable interventions, which they also describe as being nudges; this
establishes still another sense of their concept.
In sum, nudge can mean: (1) an intervention that interferes with the choice
conditions minimally; (2) an intervention that uses rationality failures instru-
mentally; and (3) a welfare-promoting intervention that tries to reduce the
negative effects of rationality failures. We will unimaginatively say ‘nudge
1’, ‘nudge 2’ and ‘nudge 3’, respectively, for these properties. This paper
will elaborate on these three deﬁnitions and, once they are more precisely
ﬁxed, investigate their logical relations. An earlier version complemented this
semantic analysis with a critical discussion of T&S’s concrete examples of
nudges. We have dispensed here with this step not only for the sake of
brevity, but also because we believe that the semantic analysis has independent
interest. The original idea of nudge is intrinsically equivocal, as the three mean-
ings above testify, and no doubt in part for this reason, it has spread out
anarchically in behavioural economics and policy research. Writers in these
ﬁelds often claim the label for a variety of proposed interventions without
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explaining what this means for them; others justify its wide-ranging application
by entirely idiosyncratic deﬁnitions. Not surprisingly, the lists of nudges that
circulate contain clearly irrelevant items. The success of this promising idea
coincides with a semantic laxness that it is perhaps time to restrain.
Besides innumerable applications, the nudge idea has given rise to a reﬂective
literature in social theory and philosophy, and a word is needed to locate our
paper in this corpus. Most contributors here are also, and in fact primarily,
concerned with libertarian paternalism, a social ethics conception that T&S
defend at the same time as welfare-promoting nudges. In the two authors’
work, this conception antedates the terminology and, to some extent, the
very idea of nudge.2 Their longstanding interest is to reconcile libertarianism
(in the sense of respecting the individual’s freedom of choice) and paternalism
(in the sense of giving priority to welfare improvement over the individual’s
spontaneous will). A major argument in Nudge is that welfare-promoting
nudges implement libertarian paternalism, and thus provide evidence that
this is a feasible doctrine despite its inherent tension. Unlike most of the reﬂec-
tive literature, our paper investigates neither this alleged connection, nor liber-
tarian paternalism in any other way; it entirely shifts the focus away from
normative to semantic analysis. To our knowledge, only Bovens (2009) and
Hansen (2016) investigate nudge distinctly from libertarian paternalism, and
only the latter compares possible deﬁnitions as we do here. This is not to
suggest that joint discussions of nudge and libertarian paternalism are unhelp-
ful for our purposes, and the comparison section will comment on some seman-
tic ideas taken from these normative discussions.
The starting point in Nudge
We extract two main suggestions from Nudge.
“A nudge, as will use the term, is any aspect of the choice architecture that
alters people’s behavior in a predictable way without forbidding any option
or signiﬁcantly changing their economic incentives” (2009, p. 6).
“In accordance with our deﬁnition, a nudge is any factor that signiﬁcantly
alters the behavior of Humans although it would be ignored by Econs”
(2009, p. 8).
These two sentences enunciate meanings for nudge 1 and 2, respectively. We
currently ignore the fact that T&S refer to a “factor” or an “aspect” of the
2 The word ‘nudge’ does not appear in T&S’s work before the book. However, several of the
interventions proposed there belonged to their earlier papers (Sunstein & Thaler, 2003a and
2003b) and were critically discussed at the time (see Mitchell, 2005).
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choice conditions rather than an intervention directly; this is a secondary
equivocation to be discussed later. The pair of sentences can be understood dif-
ferently depending on how one reads “our deﬁnition” in the second. This
expression may either refer to what comes next in the second sentence or to
what was previously said in the ﬁrst. Depending on this grammatical choice,
either nudge 1 or nudge 2 is the real deﬁnition, with the other property
being only derivative. Whichever solution one chooses, the two properties
need to be logically related, but we will discuss this problem only after ﬁxing
more precise meanings for each separately.
Nudge 1 and its two conditions
Regarding nudge 1, there are two conditions: (i) not forbidding any option and
(ii) not signiﬁcantly changing the economic incentives.3 Condition (i) is best
construed in terms of physically deﬁned options. Not only does this interpret-
ation give more bite to (i) than if one takes the options to be subjectively per-
ceived, but it also helps delineate (ii) by contrast; that is, (ii) will concern the
manipulation of non-physical – notably ﬁnancial – aspects of the options.
We take the “not forbidding” requirement at face value, thus permitting the
set to remain the same or to be enlarged, and excluding all reductions,
unlike Hansen (2016, p. 167), who argues that some are compatible with
nudge. The possibility of a larger set plays a critical role below.
The analysis of condition (ii) is more troublesome. On the one hand, it seems
natural to call upon standard economics to decide what “changing the eco-
nomic incentives” means, and this suggests interpreting this in terms of
changes in ﬁnancial constraints or more primitive changes in either prices or
personal incomes. The interventions usually considered in welfare economics
change prices through indirect taxes or subsidies and personal incomes
through direct taxes or subsidies. An advantage of this very standard interpret-
ation is that it turns (ii) into an objective condition. On the other hand, it is so
restrictive as to make (ii) virtually powerless. To borrow a counterexample
from Hansen and Jespersen (2013) and Hansen (2016), an electroshock
therapy would satisfy the incentive condition for nudge. Hence, the temptation
of restating (ii) without the “economic” adjective. T&S themselves warrant this
move in a footnote they append to the ﬁrst sentence: “Some of our nudges do,
in a sense, impose cognitive (rather than material) costs, and in that sense alter
3 The authors have initially contented themselves with the ﬁrst condition. “Choices are not
blocked or fenced off” was all they required in Sunstein and Thaler (2003a, p. 1162). Only in
Nudge and later work do they envisage the second condition.
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incentives. Nudges count as such … only if any costs are low” (2009, p. 6,
emphasis in original).4 However, to extend (ii) in this way would defeat the
purpose of treating nudge 1 objectively. Cognitive costs are not directly observ-
able apart from in some experimental contexts, and to assess them indirectly by
changes in observable behaviour poses an obvious risk of circularity. Once
these two sources of evidence are excluded, there only remain introspection
reports and verbal testimonies, which are not entirely reliable sources to use.
We suggest an intermediary solution, which keeps the “economic” adjective,
but construes it less narrowly than was ﬁrst proposed. By drawing on basic
decision theory rather than basic economics, we will consider not only (1) a
physical set of options and (2) ﬁnancial constraints, but also (3) beliefs and
(4) preferences. By deﬁnition, a change in economic incentives will consist of
a change in one or more of these four determinants of decisions, granting
that changes in the option set must be increasing so as to preserve compatibility
with (i). Thus, we introduce two more channels for an intervention besides
standard economic constraints; one may induce new choices also by acting
on preferences and beliefs. These two channels can be explored empirically
either by the specialised techniques of decision theory or, more naively, by
the means of folk psychology. Beliefs and preferences are the target attitudes
of mind reading, in the folk-psychological sense, and they can be contrasted
with cognitive costs, which mind reading is not concerned with. This brief
sketch is enough to suggest that it is easier to glean information on beliefs
and preferences than on cognitive costs.
The introduction of beliefs and preferences is compatible both with a clas-
sical rationality modelling, as in expected utility theory, and non-standard
modelling in which no probability appears, preferences may not be ordered
and adding options may violate revealed preference conditions. Thus, we do
not sever possible connections with nudge 2. Some would recommend rank-
dependent utility theory (RDU) as an intermediary ground, but there are
other theoretical possibilities, and we do not need to make a choice here.5
Nudge 2 and the problem of identifying rationality failures
In the sentence above, T&S express nudge 2 by contrasting “Humans” with
“Econs,” a pleasant but obscure allegory. Fortunately, they soon translate
the allegory into drearier, but more usable language. They do not mean
4 The issue of cognitive versus material costs surfaces again in Sunstein (2014, p. 38).
5 RDU generalises expected utility by allowing distortions of cumulative probabilities and, in
some versions, accommodates the endowment effect discussed below; see Wakker’s (2010) up-to-
date presentation. Oliver (2013) includes RDU in the corpus of behavioural economics.
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different populations; rather, they view each individual as hosting both a
Human and an Econ.6 They offer two renderings for this internal division.
The ﬁrst – see T&S (2009, p. 19) and, more emphatically, Sunstein (2014,
Ch. 1) – exploits a famous construction of recent psychology, which separates
two modes of cognitive functioning, also described as ‘systems’. System 1 is
supposedly quick, semi-automatic, not fully conscious and likely to make
mistakes; System 2 is supposedly slow, reﬂective and deliberative, fully
conscious and less susceptible to mistakes. By a major tenet of this theory,
each system has a consistent mode of operation and works essentially inde-
pendently of the other. Each system is better adapted than the other to
speciﬁc tasks, but they can nonetheless compete or cooperate on the same
task. The second theoretical rendering – see T&S (2009, Ch. 1–3) – exploits
a list of rationality failures borrowed from current behavioural economics.
Thus, there are two possible meanings for nudge 2, either as an intervention
that brings about a response from System 1 and none from System 2 or as an
intervention that instrumentally relies on rationality failures taken from the list.
Two-system theory ﬁts well with the picture of a Human and an Econ coexist-
ing within the same individual, but it has the two drawbacks of being conten-
tious and not easily applicable in practice. As it turns out, the list is T&S’s
effective tool of analysis, and as in the bulk of the literature, we will restrict
attention to it.7 There are three broad groups in it: ‘biases and blunders’,
‘temptation’ and ‘following the herd’. We brieﬂy consider them in turn,
having two guiding questions in mind: is each item really a rationality
failure? And does behavioural economics really handle each item better than
decision theory can do? Notice the two questions, although closely related,
are distinct. In the same spirit, Hausman and Welch ask: “Why shouldn’t
these factors be regarded as interferences with rational choice rather than as
rational determinants of choice?” (2010, p. 126). We unfold Hausman and
Welch’s question by distinguishing what pertains to rationality as broadly
thought of and what pertains to the disciplinary comparison of behavioural
economics with decision theory.
The third group – ‘following the herd’ – hardly passes the test of our two
questions. On the one hand, not all gregarious behaviour involves a rationality
failure. For example, bank runs and ﬁnancial crashes can be rationalised as
6 By contrast, asymmetric paternalism considers interpersonal differences in responding to inter-
ventions (Camerer et al., 2003). More on this disanalogy in Mitchell (2005).
7 Heilmann (2014) and Selinger and Whyte (2011) use two-system theory, but these are fairly
uncommon examples. This theory raises intense controversies in current psychology. Compare the
sharp objections in Kruglanski and Gigerenzer (2011) and Gigerenzer (2010) with the reply in
Evans and Stanovitch (2013).
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second-order reactions to the other participants’ initiatives. No criterion exists
to screen off these rationalisable cases from those in which no individual inter-
est can justify the gregarious behaviour. Nudge states alleged examples of this
behaviour and treats them as if they automatically escaped rationality, but these
are dubious classiﬁcations. Some experiments show that reluctant tax payers
are more sensitive to messages like ‘Most people in this area pay their taxes’
than to messages like ‘By paying your taxes, you fund the costs of public util-
ities’. It is unclear whether this ﬁnding uncovers a genuine rationality failure
(the former message suggests a warning that the latter does not) and even
whether it involves gregariousness in the ﬁrst place (this should not be confused
with a sense of reciprocity and cooperation).8 On the other hand, the disciplin-
ary comparison is not what it should be. The behavioural economics of gregari-
ousness is marred by an identiﬁcation problem, which the tax example
illustrates, whereas economics can provide a formal deﬁnition and handle
some cases, in particular by game theoretic tools. These converging arguments
suggest excluding the third group altogether – this is not a big blow to Nudge,
because this group is under-represented compared with the other two.
The second group – ‘temptation’ – passes the double test much better, but
cannot be endorsed unreservedly. Giving in to temptation is often, though
not always, coincidental with being time inconsistent. That is, agents acting
against their own will are often, though not always, also reneging on an
earlier commitment not to act this way. Now, time inconsistency is taken to
be a rationality failure across the board, and the disciplinary comparison is
this time what it should be. Standard decision theory has little to say on time
inconsistency that is not simply a normative indictment, and behavioural
economics has developed an insightful model – hyperbolic discounting – to
account for it descriptively (e.g. Laibson, 1997). However, time inconsistency
is difﬁcult to ascertain empirically because of a possible confounding with a
change in information. Agents who seem to renege on previous commitments
may in fact react to what they have recently learned, and they may even ration-
ally do so. Here, decision theory takes revenge because it can offer well-
structured analyses in terms of Bayesian revision or even more general
models, whereas behavioural economics has little to contribute beyond the
ﬁnding that real agents often violate Bayesianism.
We will also express reservations on the ﬁrst group – ‘biases and blunders’ –
with its classic list inherited from Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky (1989):
anchoring and adjustment, availability, representativeness, overconﬁdence,
8 T&S (2009, p. 67) cite an early Minnesota study on tax compliance. More telling evidence can
be found in Hallsworth et al. (2014).
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loss aversion, status quo and framing. One may wonder why the ﬁrst three
items constitute rationality failures at all. Anchoring and adjustment can be
a normatively commendable procedure for selecting an option, as some
formal algorithms illustrate, and availability and representativeness are so
loosely deﬁned that it is equally easy to include them in, or exclude them
from, individual rationality.9 Concerning the disciplinary comparison, it is
true that these items were ﬁrst identiﬁed by Tversky and Kahneman (1974)
in connection with empirical difﬁculties of Bayesian decision theory. This is
not to say, however, that decision theory per se cannot handle them, and
even less that behavioural economics handles them better.
The next three items raise different issues. Presumably, the argument for
treating overconﬁdence as a rationality failure is that it induces the individual
to neglect available evidence or make faulty reasoning. But viewed in a different
light, overconﬁdence is a character trait, and as such neither rational nor
irrational. Decision theory can then try to absorb it into its utility apparatus,
as it has done with risk attitudes. We see no argument for claiming that loss
aversion and status quo involve rationality failures.10 The concept of rational-
ity does not preclude that the agents’ ends should be stated in terms of differ-
ences from some reference level, as status quo implies. Nor does it exclude the
notion that the agents’ evaluation may be inﬂuenced by what they already
possess, as loss aversion implies. Whether behavioural economics handles
these two items better than decision theory is a different matter. The former
has brought out telling evidence that agents often compare satisfactions in
terms of differences and by paying attention to endowments, and the latter
has been sluggish in taking these messages on board. To some extent, the dis-
ciplinary comparison depends on how one locates those decision theories, like
RDU, which empirically supersede expected utility theory.
Framing is a strange outlier in the list. By deﬁnition, a framing effect occurs
when equivalent descriptions of choice conditions induce different choices
from the agents. Framing is an effect, which is compatible with a diversity of
outcomes, rather than a bias, which normally produces outcomes in a ﬁxed dir-
ection. Also, Tversky and Kahneman’s well-known suggestion that biases
result from misapplying heuristics cannot plausibly concern framing.
Heuristics are particular cases of rules, and unless other biases are also
present, one cannot see what rule framed agents would be following. The
9 For Gigerenzer (2010), availability and representativeness illustrate the cheap use of labels
instead of models, which he calls “one-word explanations.” The same label often permits explaining
one phenomenon and its contrary.
10Notice that status quo and loss aversion are sometimes identiﬁed and sometimes kept distinct,
a further cause of embarrassment. In a rare effort, Brenner et al. (2007) try to disentangle them.
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famous epidemics examples in Tversky and Kahneman (1981) are unrepresen-
tative since they involve the status quo or loss aversion biases (e.g. see Frisch,
1993). Besides these important differences, and perhaps in connection with
them, framing is a better candidate than any other bias to the status of a ration-
ality failure, and it is also most recalcitrant to decision theoretic treatments – at
least none is in view thus far. At long last, the two questions seem to elicit clear,
positive answers. However, as with time inconsistency, there is a problem of
empirical identiﬁcation. The subjects of a framing experiment may not agree
with the equivalence postulated by the experimenter, and they can moreover
have serious reasons for this disagreement. Kahneman belatedly came to recog-
nise this major difﬁculty (in the introduction to Kahneman and Tversky, 2000).
Taking stock of the analysis, we have found nudge 2 more difﬁcult to deﬁne
than nudge 1. The semantic work is entangled here with an unsettled debate as
to what counts as a rationality failure and with a complex diagnosis of how
behavioural economics compares with decision theory when the latter is inter-
preted with some subtlety and not polemically reduced to constrained optimisa-
tion and expected utility theory. Only time inconsistency and framing provide
an unquestionable basis for nudge 2; all other cases are open to interpretations.
Logical relations between nudge 1 and nudge 2
We see only one way of logically deriving nudge 2 from nudge 1. Suppose an
intervention leaves an agent’s option set and economic incentives exactly
unchanged – a supposition permitted by the deﬁnition of nudge 1. Now
suppose the intervention nonetheless succeeds in altering the agent’s choice.
The conclusion seems inescapable that the decision process lacked rationality:
either the agent had sufﬁciently good reasons for the initial choice and thus was
wrong to revise it, since nothing changed in the choice conditions; or the agent
did not have sufﬁciently good reasons for the initial choice, which points to a
different lack of rationality. When rationality is understood in the standard
economics sense of constrained optimisation, the argument is even more
brieﬂy put: optimisers stay where they are when constraints do not change.
However, we cannot yet conclude that the intervention is nudge 2. The argu-
ment shows that a rationality failure is involved, not that it is used instrumen-
tally, as this property requires; for example, an accidental framing effect might
have taken place. There is an even more sweeping objection to make. When the
option set increases or the economic incentives undergo minor changes – two
cases that are permitted by (i) and (ii) – the argument does not apply
anymore. However slight the changes, it may be rational to revise the initial
choice. One may try to extend the range of the argument by claiming that
slight changes in the choice conditions normally deliver slight changes in the
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choices, so that a large change in the latter would signal a lack of rationality.
But this is an implausible claim; rational choice is compatible with strong dis-
continuities, as a lexicographic ordering of options illustrates.
Now consider the opposite logical direction; in other words, from nudge 2 to
nudge 1. There is one clear derivation from framing, since this effect does not
require choice conditions to change, and nudge 1 permits this complete stabil-
ity. But framing is just one example of nudge 2, and the others do not support
the derivation. Thus, an intervention based on loss aversion needs to change the
endowment, hence the option set, and this change may not be increasing, as
against (i). An intervention based on overconﬁdence will change the preferences
or beliefs relative to some options, hence the economic incentives in our sense,
and this change may not be light, as against (ii). The more biases one takes to be
relevant to nudge 2, the more difﬁcult it is to derive nudge 1. In sum, no entail-
ment holds between the two concepts at the desired level of generality.
Nudge 3 and its relation to nudge 2
We may now clear up a secondary problem in T&S’s deﬁnition of nudge.
Explicitly, they deﬁne it as an “aspect” or a “factor” of the choice conditions
(or “choice architecture,” as they like saying), not as a kind of policy interven-
tion. To connect the two senses, one will have to say that a nudge intervention
consists in using a nudge factor to exert an inﬂuence on the choices. This seems
to be too roundabout, given that policy interventions are the focus of attention
and, like most readers, and indeed Sunstein (2014, p. 17; 2015, p. 417) himself
in recent work, we prefer deﬁning nudges directly as being interventions and
ignoring the notion of nudge as a causal factor. There is another reason for
this simpliﬁcation. T&S repeatedly argue for welfare-promoting nudges by
saying that the individuals are already inﬂuenced by other nudges in their
ordinary choices. This inevitability argument has attracted much criticism in
the normative discussion. As the objection goes, it is not the same for an indi-
vidual to be inﬂuenced by a factor in the choice conditions when someone uses
this factor for a purpose and when the factor is just there without anyone in
particular being in control; see, for example, Hausman and Welch (2010)
and Grüne-Yanoff (2012). Without delving further into this important
debate, we may point out that using the same word for the intervention and
its underlying mechanism can only foster confusion between the two cases,
and this is a good reason for avoiding this language.11
11 Sunstein’s current position may sound paradoxical because he emphatically reiterates the
inevitability argument while redeﬁning nudges as being interventions. However, the argument can
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More importantly, when T&S deal with nudge interventions, they allow the
intervening party to pursue any objectives of its own, thus taking the benevo-
lent objective of welfare promotion to be a mere particular case. Marketing
research has applied the nudge concept to some of the branding, packaging
and advertising policies by which the consumer product industry hopes to
push up its sales. The properties of nudge 1 and 2 are applicable to these inter-
ventions, but this is not the case with nudge 3, which captures a subclass of
welfare-promoting interventions.
We deﬁne nudge 3 interventions as those that counteract the rationality fail-
ures affecting individuals’ decision processes. T&S do not introduce this prop-
erty as explicitly as the ﬁrst two, but it clearly underlies most of their concrete
recommendations. We sketchily review these recommendations, mentioning
for each what rationality failures it is meant to counteract. (1) The introduction
of self-commitment devices opposes the tendency to time-inconsistent reversals
of preferences and procrastination. (2) The introduction of withdrawal
(“cooling off”) periods opposes thoughtless choice and biases such as over-
conﬁdence. (3) The imposition of disclosure practices on businesses and admin-
istrations opposes thoughtless choice and the framing effect. (4) The
introduction of default options or forced choices, depending on the area,
opposes choice overloading, the tendency to procrastination and biases
related to inertia such as loss aversion. One may worry that T&S tend to
enlarge their initial list of rationality failures when they approach concrete
examples, but we do not push this point here.
Rather, we capitalise on these examples to explore the conceptual dimen-
sions of nudge 3. We distinguish two of them, one regarding the possible
ways an intervention counteracts rationality failures and the other regarding
the nature of the improvement brought about by the intervention. To spell
out the ﬁrst dimension, an intervention can be preventative or only mitigating;
in other words, it can preclude rationality failures from occurring in the deci-
sion process or permit their occurrence while limiting their impact on this
process. Thus, withdrawal periods and forced choices are preventative,
whereas default options are only mitigating. A third possibility that is not illu-
strated here, but enters the deﬁnition of nudge 3, is to let the failures occur and
act on the choices themselves; for example, by penalising or compensating
transfers. This ex post intervention, which is in the spirit of traditional
welfare economics, involves neither prevention nor mitigation.
still be defended on the view that innumerable previous interventions have shaped today’s choice
conditions.
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To spell out the second dimension, an intervention can be only remedial or
only corrective or both at a time. By a remedial intervention, we mean one that
counteracts the rationality failure in the given choice situation, and by a cor-
rective intervention, we mean one that teaches the agent something generally
usable about rationality failures. Thus, the imposition of withdrawal periods
is merely remedial and to penalise poor decisions ex post would be merely cor-
rective. The imposition of disclosure practices can have both properties.
RECAP requires credit card companies to draw a clear separation between
interest rates and fees in their customers’ statements. This should not only
inﬂuence the way customers use their credit cards with their company, but
also teach them a difﬁdence rule they could remember in other dealings, such
as when they take a mortgage loan from a bank.
The involvement of nudge 3 with rationality failures makes it superﬁcially close
to nudge 2, and some common formulations – like ‘nudges draw on the ﬁndings
of behavioural economics’ or ‘nudges trade on bounded rationality’ – erase the
distinction. This lowers theoretical standards dramatically, since it is so much
easier to reconcile nudge 1 indiscriminately with nudges 2 or 3 than with just
one – and a fortiori the two – of them. There is a clear difference between the
two properties: a nudge 2 intervention uses the failures instrumentally for what-
ever objective the intervention pursues and a nudge 3 intervention counteracts
them by whatever means are deemed relevant. Not only are these concepts dis-
tinct, but they bear no entailment relations. To check that in one logical direction,
think of information and persuasion efforts, which satisfy nudge 3, but may not
involve any instrumental use of rationality failures, hence may not satisfy nudge
2. The reverse entailment is also blocked, even if one only considers welfare-
promoting nudge 2 interventions. Think of a public health (e.g. vaccination) cam-
paign based on a framing effect. From Tversky and Kahneman (1981) and later
conﬁrmatory evidence, the campaign should be more successful with a ‘positive’
frame (emphasising the success rate) than with a ‘negative’ frame (emphasising
the complementary failure rate). This intervention employs a bias for a
welfare-related purpose without trying to counteract it.
The previous example is somewhat extreme because to counteract framing,
in whatever sense we take for this, can only nullify an intervention based on
framing. This is not necessarily the case with other rationality failures. For
example, an intervention can counteract one effect of hyperbolic discounting
while strategically using another of its effects. Thaler and Benartzi (2004)
have argued for a new pension saving scheme precisely in this way. Their
recommended pension scheme, Save More Tomorrow (SMT), makes increases
in future savings coincidental with future increases in incomes. Arguably, this
feature exploits the psychology of hyperbolic discounters. These agents believe
they will save appropriate amounts in the future, but do not do so when the
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time comes, and they are the more easily deceived since the actual saving deci-
sion is to be made in a more remote future. By starting with relatively low
amounts and suitably delaying the increases, one takes advantage of their ten-
dency for self-deception to counteract their threatening time inconsistency.
Also, one rationality failure can serve to ﬁght another. Here are possible
examples: employ overconﬁdence against the endowment effect and the ten-
dency to inertia, availability against overconﬁdence and framing against any
other bias. Some of these examples are sketched in Nudge and explored
more thoroughly elsewhere. They capture what seems to be a major heuristic
for developing the idea of nudge (i.e. the combination of nudges 2 and 3 to
devise innovative welfare-promoting interventions). In principle, nudge 1 has
no role to play in this heuristic. Plainly, it neither entails nor is entailed by
nudge 3, and it can only be an interesting coincidence if the three properties
are met on the same intervention.
Comparisons
Our semantics of nudge can brieﬂy be compared with others in the literature.
Bovens (2009) deﬁnes a nudge as “a manipulation of people’s choices via the
choice architecture, i.e., the way in which the choices are presented to them.”
In our terms, this amounts to restricting nudge to be nudge 2 and, in effect,
to the employment of framing. This restriction fosters the claim that nudges
are manipulative, a claim that loses plausibility when other rationality failures
are taken into account. For instance, it is hard to see why the offer of self-com-
mitting devices should always be manipulative; think of a self-committing
device being entirely rigid and offered just one period before the future deci-
sion, so that the time lag effect involved in SMT is not present. The following
deﬁnitions capture richer concepts of nudge.
Here is Hausman and Welch’s (2010, p. 126): “Nudges are ways of inﬂuen-
cing choice without limiting the choice set or making alternatives appreciably
more costly in terms of time, trouble, social sanctions, and so forth. They are
called for because of ﬂaws in individual decision-making, and they work by
making use of these ﬂaws.”12 In our terms, this takes nudge interventions to
satisfy the conjunction of nudges 1, 2 and 3 together, a maximally demanding
conception of nudge.
Oliver’s (2013, p. 4–5) deﬁnition also compounds properties: “For an inter-
vention to be classiﬁed as a nudge it needs to be liberty preserving, rely on the
12We read a similar deﬁnition in Selinger and Whyte (2011, p. 926), though these writers gen-
erally emphasise the more limited conjunction of nudges 1 and 2.
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automatic, reﬂexive responses of those targeted and not involve overly overt
methods of persuasion, not signiﬁcantly change economic incentives and has
to redesign the choice context according to the ﬁndings of behavioural econom-
ics.” This roughly equates nudge with the conjunction of nudge 1 (interpreting
“liberty preserving” in the sense of (i)), nudge 2 (using a System 1 criterion of
“reﬂexive responses”) and a non-overtness property we do not include in nudge
2 (again, because this property primarily concerns framing). Nudge 3 is not
mentioned, but this remains a demanding conception.13
Hansen’s (2016, pp. 158 and 170) deﬁnition is difﬁcult to quote without
reviewing its complex supportive argument. Roughly speaking, it minimally
consists of nudge 2 compounded with nudge 3 and, in an expanded variant,
with a further property that substitutes for nudge 1. This only requires that
the interventions “work independently of” decreasing the option set or signiﬁ-
cantly changing the incentives (here widely deﬁned). Accordingly, Hansen
permits interventions that instrumentally depend on both rationality failures
and nudge 1-violating changes. The unity of nudge becomes less problematic
and its scope correspondingly enlarged.14
Conclusions
Starting from T&S’s theoretical hints for nudges 1 and 2 and their concrete
examples for nudge 3, we made these properties more precise and explored
their logical relations. Hopefully, this will have brought some order to the
promising but still confused ideas of the book. Our framework has also facili-
tated comparisons within the secondary literature, an exercise that should be
extended beyond the sample presented here. One of our conclusions is that
no logical relation holds between the properties at the proper level of general-
ity. There is no doubt that T&S meant nudge to be a unitary concept, and the
deﬁnitions we quoted generally aim at capturing this intention. To reconcile it
with our negative logical ﬁnding, two distinctive moves suggest themselves.
One consists in redeﬁning one or more of the three properties. This is well illu-
strated by Hansen’s replacement of nudge 1 by a less demanding variant.
Alternatively, one could restrict nudge 2 to framing, so as to make nudge 1
13Oliver (2015) usefully emphasises a property of welfare-promoting nudges we have abstracted
from here; i.e. that it does not aim at remedying negative compositional effects or negative external-
ities. This is now well recognised by Sunstein (2014, p. 28), who contrasts “internalities,” the sole
object of nudge, with collective rationality failures.
14McQuillin and Sugden (2012, p. 560) and Grüne-Yanoff (2012, p. 639) are not so explicit
about what they mean by nudge, but we can liken their concepts to nudge 2 conjoined with nudge
3. Like Qizilbash (2012) and still others, they are largely concerned with an issue not addressed
here – what kind of preferences the intervening party should attribute to the party intervened on.
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derivable from nudge 2, or limit nudge 1 to exactly unchanged choice condi-
tions, so as to make nudge 2 derivable from nudge 1. The fact that redeﬁnition
strategies tamper with T&S’swording is inessential, since they primarily aim at
endowing nudge with more theoretical substance, and it is enough for this
project to keep in touch with T&S’s heuristics. We have followed a similar
interpretative line here. However, these strategies call for more speciﬁc objec-
tions. Hansen’s property makes nudge compatible with reductions of the
choice set and signiﬁcant changes in incentives, and this could make nudge
difﬁcult to separate from traditional interventions. And the above restriction
strategies involve too much of a loss of content to be pursued.
Another response is to keep the deﬁnitions and make unitary sense of nudge
in a non-logical, (i.e. factual) way. If this line is taken, there must be a sufﬁ-
ciently large set of examples satisfying the three properties, or at least two of
them, for nudge to remain a unitary concept, and this could be decided only
by reviewing concrete examples.15 Here we can at least make a methodological
claim in advance. There is of course nothing wrong in deﬁning a concept by a
collection of properties that are only factually related. Scientiﬁc ﬁelds like
biology and astronomy often proceed in this way; think of the standard
species concepts in the former ﬁeld or – a lesser known example – of the
planet concept in the latter. However, the role of concepts so deﬁned
appears to be limited to facilitating description and classiﬁcation. There are
no deep theoretical stakes involved in the deﬁnition of a ﬁsh versus a
mammal, or a planet versus a dwarf planet. These contrasts vary through
time with the discovery of new objects that are difﬁcult to classify, and when
this happens, the theoretical structure of the ﬁeld remains untouched. As this
quick comparison suggests, one should not expect too much from a nudge
concept that would exhibit some factual overlap between nudges 1, 2 and 3
and no more semantic unity than that. It would certainly help classify existing
interventions and help discover interventions not yet thought of, but it could
hardly be the basis for a theoretical revolution in policy research.
There is still another line that consists in giving up the unitary perspective
and pursuing each property in isolation. A reﬁned nudge 1 concept can help
delineate what a light intervention is; there is nothing in traditional welfare eco-
nomics that exactly captures this idea. A reﬁned nudge 2 concept would open
up new avenues for both policy research and more foundational work. Against
the received idea that behavioural economics is unorthodoxy, we argued that
decision theory (rather than economics) could appropriate alleged biases by
treating them as psychological determinants of rational choice. More generally,
15 For a preliminary sketch, see Mongin and Cozic (2014).
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the boundaries of the two ﬁelds in policy research must be considered anew,
and this task will succeed more easily if one pursues it having only nudge 2
in mind. Last but not least, a reﬁned nudge 3 concept can decisively extend
the realm of public policies; policy research has too long ignored the fact
that rationality failures called for remedies and corrections. Here, again,
there is an advantage in developing the concept in isolation. Actually, Jolls
and Sunstein’s (2006) “debiasing through law” programme was like a separate
implementation of nudge 3 before nudge ofﬁcially entered the stage, for better
or worse. They proposed that the law should respond to rationality failures not
only by adjusting legal norms accordingly (e.g. by raising safety requirements
to take overconﬁdence into account), but also by “operating directly on the
boundedly rational behavior and attempting to help people either to reduce
or to eliminate it” (2006, p. 201) (e.g. by requiring ﬁrms to provide vivid evi-
dence of difﬁcult cases and clear warnings that their products may be danger-
ous). In our terms, this amounts to exploring nudge 3 without entangling it
with either nudge 1 or even nudge 2.16
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